When FDI Flows from Rich to Poor Countries

Do Democracy and Economic Reform Matter? by Manzocchi, Stefano & Salisoy Guerin, Selen
  
 
When FDI Flows 
from Rich to Poor Countries: 
Do democracy and economic reform matter? 
 
 
CEPS Working Document No. 251/October 2006 
 
 
Selen Sarisoy Guerin and Stefano Manzocchi 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an instrument of international capital flow and it also 
shares some features of international trade flows as it is often associated with intra-firm 
trade by multinational corporations. Combining features from both ‘growth-type’ and 
‘gravity-type’ models, we argue that democracy and economic reform in emerging 
economies have a joint positive impact on FDI inflows from advanced countries. This 
effect of democracy and economic reform is robust even when the EU membership 
negotiations are taken into account. We conclude that the role of democracy and 
market-oriented reform is robust and widespread beyond European borders. On the 
other hand, our results can be interpreted as evidence that prospects of joining the EU 
acts as an anchor for the host country.  
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WHEN FDI FLOWS FROM 
RICH TO POOR COUNTRIES:  
DO DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC REFORM MATTER? 
SELEN SARISOY GUERIN AND STEFANO MANZOCCHI* 
1. Introduction 
Among instruments of international capital transfer, foreign direct investment (FDI) raises 
special interest for a number of reasons. FDI is commonly identified as a more stable vehicle of 
cross-border investment, relative to portfolio flows, hence exposing host countries to lower 
capital account volatility (OECD, 2001). It is often associated with positive technology and/or 
human capital spillover from the source country to the host economy (see e.g. Damijan et al., 
2003). Being in principle related to productive activities, FDI can contribute to enlarge and 
reinforce the industrial structure of recipient countries, while at the same time enhancing the 
competitiveness of the source economies (Barba Navaretti & Venables, 2004). As FDI is 
generally considered beneficial for both the source and host economies, a great deal of research 
as well as policy debate has recently focused both on FDI attraction by nations and regions and 
on the international activities of multinational firms (UNCTAD, 2005).1 
Despite ‘location tournaments’ among developing countries, FDI flows remain heavily 
concentrated as two-way flows between the developed countries, and only a small number of 
developing countries have been successful in attracting large sums of FDI. This observation 
lends itself to the two main puzzles in the literature on the allocation of international capital 
flows. The first puzzle is the ‘Lucas puzzle’ of scarce capital inflows into developing countries. 
Lucas (1990) has pointed out that the allocation patterns of international capital flows were not 
in line with what neoclassical growth models with capital mobility would have predicted. These 
models predict that capital should flow where it is scarce to reap the benefits of high return at a 
given risk level, hence promoting growth and conditional convergence between rich and poor 
countries. In the literature, the Lucas puzzle can be partly accounted for by considering cross-
country differences in human capital and infrastructure endowments. The empirical models that 
are used to explain this puzzle often use growth-type variables, such as factor endowments and 
educational attainment (Borezstein et al., 1998, among others).  
Recently an increasing number of empirical studies on international asset trade adopted the 
gravity model of international trade literature. The results from these studies led to the second 
puzzle, which recently came to be known as the ‘distance puzzle’2: the empirical literature has 
shown that increased distance deters FDI. Although this finding might seem intuitive, it is 
contradictory to the portfolio allocation theory, according to which investors should try to 
maximise their returns while diversifying and minimising the systemic risk in their portfolios. In 
other words, if portfolio diversification motives were at play in the case of FDI, we would 
expect to see more direct investment in more distant locations, not in nearby markets as these 
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markets are more likely to be correlated with the home market of the investor. In general, the 
global allocation of FDI flows indicates that direct investors follow categorically neither high 
returns nor risk diversification. The distance puzzle, however, can be partly explained by 
information and transaction costs, and can be alleviated when the source and host countries 
share a common language and law. The gravity models of FDI, as of trade, are formulated to 
include standard variables, such as economic size, distance, and also recently bilateral telephone 
traffic (e.g. Loungani et al., 2002; Guerin, 2005).  
This study is motivated by these two puzzles and aims to add to this literature specifically as 
well as to the literature on the determinants of North-South FDI. The main contribution of this 
paper is that we examine the role of political institutions and market-oriented reform on FDI in 
the framework of a hybrid model that borrows elements from both growth-type and gravity-type 
models. The economics of institutions has been examined by many distinguished scholars 
(Acemoglu et al., 2004; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000), but the use of institutional factors in FDI 
literature is relatively new (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005; Busse, 2003; Busse & Hefeker, 2005).  
The next section contains a review of selected contributions to the literature on the determinants 
of FDI. Section three outlines our empirical methodology, and describes our dataset. 
Econometric results are presented in section four, while final comments and issues for further 
research are discussed in section five. 
2. A brief review of the literature on the determinants of North-South 
FDI 
The empirical literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment evolved over the last 
two decades in line with new theoretical models. The empirical literature that deals with 
aggregate FDI flows in a macroeconomic framework has concentrated on variables commonly 
used in models of international capital flows (e.g. market size, income, exchange rates, 
infrastructure, real wage differentials, etc.). Although these variables explain which country 
characteristics might attract FDI, still the Lucas and the distance puzzles prevail.3 
Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Manzocchi and Martin (1996) argue that the human capital 
factor plays an important role in explaining why capital does not flow from rich to poor 
countries, or why FDI might not promote growth and faster convergence. In an empirical study, 
Zebregs (1998) examines the distribution of FDI flows across developing countries and finds 
that standard neoclassical models can not explain the concentration of FDI flows in a few 
developing countries.  
Although neoclassical models would have predicted that poor countries have a higher rate of 
return to capital given diminishing returns, the data show that FDI flows are strongly 
concentrated on a two-way pattern among rich countries. The development of microeconomic 
foundations by multinational firms, stemming from the ‘new trade theory’, provided a 
theoretical explanation for the evidence that FDI would take place between countries that are 
similar in size and in relative endowments. The gravity models of international trade, already 
very successful in explaining bilateral trade flows, have therefore gained popularity in 
explaining international investment flows as well. 
Although the use of gravity models is recent in the asset trade literature, it is quickly growing in 
numbers (see for example: Ghosh & Wolf, 1998; Eaton & Tamura, 1994; Di Mauro, 2000; 
Hausman & Fernandez-Arias, 2000; Chunlai, 1997; De Menil 1999; Wei 1997; Wei, 2000; and 
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Portes & Rey, 2002). Carstensen and Toubal (2003) and Razin et al. (2005) use modified 
gravity models to explain bilateral FDI flows. Loungani et al. (2002) question why gravity 
models work for asset flows, and attempt to explain the distance puzzle. They conclude that the 
distance puzzle can be reduced by going beyond consideration of physical distance to concepts 
of transactional distance and scale economies. Since it is less probable that ‘distance’ represents 
transport costs in the case of FDI, contrary to the case for international trade, the negative 
relationship between distance and bilateral FDI flows has been interpreted as evidence of 
positive information costs to investment abroad. Therefore, the more recent empirical equations 
on the determinants of FDI have been augmented to include more direct measures of 
information costs, such as bilateral telephone traffic (Loungani et al., 2002; Guerin, 2005). The 
negative sign for the distance variable was robust to the inclusion of such direct measures of 
information flows between two countries, hence the puzzle remained. 
Although bilateral FDI flows can be to some extent explained by gravity-type models, it is hard 
to accept that the geographical location of a country alone may determine its attractiveness vis-
à-vis foreign investors, and possibly its economic fortunes. Recently, there is a new strand of 
literature on the determinants of FDI that correlate institutional factors with the FDI 
attractiveness of the host country. For example, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) examine the role of 
the quality of institutions on FDI in a set of 52 countries. They first re-examine the role of the 
governance infrastructure in the host and source countries and also the effect of bilateral 
institutional distance. They find that institutions matter independently of GDP per capita. 
Overall, their results indicate that if the institutional quality of a developing host country 
increases, this can help the host country catch up with the source countries. Busse and Hefeker 
(2005) explore the linkages between political risk, institutions and FDI. Their results suggest 
that government stability, the absence of internal conflict and ethnic tensions, basic democratic 
rights and ensuring law and order are significant for FDI.   
Our study aims to go further and contribute to the literature on the determinants of FDI flows 
between North and South countries by focusing on institutions: namely, democracy and 
economic reform in emerging host economies. The use of institutional factors as economic 
determinants is difficult due to endogeneity problems, and is subject to criticism. This paper 
benefits from the work of Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004) and Persson and Tabellini (2006a). 
They use ‘objective’ measures of democratic and economic liberalisation in their analysis of the 
institutions’ impact on economic performance. By using objective measures of democratic and 
economic reform, we aim to improve the existing literature that relates institutions to FDI. 
3. Empirical methodology and data 
Gravity models of trade (see for instance Egger, 2002; Antonucci & Manzocchi, 2006) and of 
FDI (Carstensen & Toubal, 2003; Guerin, 2005; Razin et al., 2005) are often estimated in a 
static or dynamic log-log format.4 When estimation is performed with longitudinal data (panel 
data), OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) produces biased results if the individual country-effects 
(heterogeneity) are statistically significant and are omitted from the model. In other words, 
whenever the intercept and/or the slopes of the ‘true’ regression are country-specific, and a 
linear specification is more suitable, then it is the panel fixed-effects or random-effects 
estimation methods that produce unbiased and efficient results. The choice between a fixed-
effects and a random-effects model depends on whether country parameters and control 
variables are orthogonal. Another consideration in the choice between the two also depends on 
the shape of the panel: if the time-dimension of the panel is very large relative to the spatial 
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dimension, then it is the fixed-effects that are consistent. However, panel datasets generally are 
characterised with large cross-sections observed over a short period of time, which is the case in 
our dataset (n=364 t=13). In this case, the fixed-effects estimator produces inconsistent results: 
this is known in the literature as the ‘incidental parameter’ problem (Baltagi, 2001). 
FDI data, and especially North-South FDI data, present one more problem namely a large 
number of zero observations in the bilateral flow matrix. This can be due to a number of 
reasons: 
• reporting problems and measurement errors (in this case, linear models may account for 
that: see Razin et al., 2005); 
• fixed costs in establishing and implementing FDI-related initiatives and projects, for 
instance due to administrative and financial requirements related to different legal systems. 
In this case, Razin et al. (2005) suggest that a Heckman selection model might be the most 
appropriate to study the determinants of bilateral FDI; 
• indivisibilities in FDI flows, due either to the physical or human capital nature of the 
investment projects, or reporting conventions (for instance, international institutions classify 
equity participations as FDI only if they exceed some percentage of the total company 
capital, say 10 or 20%). 
If potential bilateral North-South flows do not always materialise due to investment 
indivisibilities, or are not recorded as actual FDI due to statistical conventions, it can well be 
that the reported entry of gross FDI inflow is zero, or even negative (e.g. in the case of large 
repatriated earnings from South to North country exceeding inflows of equity and intra-firm 
loans to emerging host countries). As we are interested in gross North-South inflows, we adopt 
a non-linear empirical model that allows us to estimate a log-log equation without losing the 
information associated with negative and zero entries in the bilateral North-South FDI matrix. In 
order to keep the negative and zero observations, we follow Yeyati et al. (2003) and use a 
transformation of the gross inflows as the dependent variable (see Appendix A for the details). 
We estimate our model by a random-effects tobit model that is left censored at zero (see 
Peracchi, 2004). 5 
Our equation is then: 
ln(inflowijt )= αij +µt+  β0lnGDPit +β1lnGDPjt + β2lnGDPcit + β3lnGDPcjt + β4Xijt +uijt        (1) 
where inflowijt, is bilateral gross FDI inflows from source country j to host country i at time t in 
constant 2000 US dollars. We use GDP of the host country at time t (GDPit) and GDP of the 
source country at time t (GDPjt,) as measures of the size of the markets; and we use GDP per 
capita of the source country at time t (GDPcjt) and GDP per capita of the host country at time t 
(GDPcit) as measures of income. These variables are also in constant 2000 US dollars. The 
country-pair specific (random) effects, αij, captures all the time-invariant factors, such as 
distance, common language, common legal origin, etc., while µ is a time dummy. Other 
explanatory variables, Xijt, are the log of bilateral trade (lagged to avoid possible endogeneity 
concerns), educational attainments in the host countries, continent dummies (Latin America, 
Asia, Africa and Europe), and a set of proxies for institutions and reform. 
As for democracy and economic reform, which are at the centre of our study, we expect that 
ceteris paribus FDI flows more to South host countries where political and economic regimes 
are more open and more market oriented. One problem is that many measures suffer from being 
                                                     
5 Razin et al. (2005) take negative entries as evidence of previous FDI flows, and estimate the fixed cost 
of FDI based on that information: this looks like a rather ad hoc modeling choice.  
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subjective, namely they are reported as scores attributed by experts or economic agents to each 
country and over time. Campos and Horvath (2006) propose instead objective measures of 
liberalisation and reform, based on economic variables, but they provide them only for a limited 
number of countries over time (the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe). 
Another issue is that of ‘input’ versus ‘output’ measures, the former being related to policy 
decisions and the latter to policy outcomes: this is relevant as output measures are more likely to 
be endogenous than input ones in respect to FDI flows. 
In this study, we follow the approach suggested by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004) and use their 
measure of democracy to capture the political regime liberalisation in our sample.6 We augment 
equation (1) to take account of two binary variables for institutional arrangements that are likely 
to be associated with FDI attractiveness in emerging economies: democracy and EU 
membership negotiations. These binary variables describe the condition of the individual host 
country each year. The democracy variable has two advantages over other measures of 
institutional regime. First, using a binary variable to mark the year a country adopts a permanent 
democratic regime should overcome the endogeneity problems that may arise when using 
‘output’ measures of institutional quality. Second, when referred to a set of standard 
institutional arrangements as in the definition adopted by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004), it 
comes rather close to an objective rather than a subjective measure of institutional regime. 
Selecting an objective, input measure of economic reform is more complex, and data for many 
countries and years are not available. As a first approximation, we take the log of privatisation 
proceeds as an index of market-oriented economic reform, which has the advantage of being 
objective. However, being an output measure of reform, this variable could lead to endogeneity 
problems. 
FDI data are obtained from the OECD’s International Direct Investment Database (2006), which 
provides data on bilateral inflows and outflows of FDI. Each OECD member country reports 
bilateral ‘outflows to’ and ‘inflows from’ other member and a number of partner countries. All 
values were originally expressed in the reporting countries’ own national currency units, which 
were then converted into constant 2000 US dollars using OECD’s yearly average exchange rates 
and US GDP deflator. There are 14 developed and 24 emerging developing countries in our 
sample (see Appendix B for list of countries in the sample). Other data on the explanatory 
variables come from various sources (see Appendix C). The time range for our sample is from 
1992 to 2004. Both the cross-country and the time dimension on our panel were chosen to 
maximise data points and avoid missing observations.  
4. Econometric findings 
We start with a simple model that includes the basic gravity-type variables (i.e. GDPs of both 
source and host country) plus the random-effects that capture all country-pair specific time-
invariant variables (a proxy for geographical and cultural distance) and growth-type variables 
(i.e. GDP per capita of both source and host countries). The results from random-effects tobit 
regression for our benchmark equation are reported in Table 1. Since the random-effects 
estimator uses Gauss-Hermite quadrature to compute the log likelihood and its derivatives, we 
checked all our results in this table and the ones that follow for quadrature sensitivity. All 
                                                     
6 Giavazzi and Tabellini (2006) also suggest a binary measure of economic liberalisation. However, this 
measure is likely to be more ‘subjective’ than the political one, and anyway it does not display enough 
variability in our dataset to allow a test of its effect on FDI inflows. 
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results reported are stable hence the results can be confidently interpreted.7 The gravity-type 
determinants of FDI as the GDP of source and host country have a significant positive impact 
on bilateral FDI inflows from developed countries to emerging markets. Both country-pair time-
invariant effects and the time-dummies are significant (the likelihood-ratio test (χ2) reported in 
the last row of each table is a test of the significance of the random-effects).8 A different picture 
emerges for the growth-type variables: while per capita GDP in the source country is a 
significant and positive determinant of bilateral FDI flows, per capita GDP in the host country is 
not a robust determinant when continent dummies are included. This indicates that while richer 
countries do invest more FDI in the emerging markets, there is no evidence that the poorer 
among host countries are the ones that attract most of these flows (a partial restatement of the 
Lucas puzzle).  
Table 1. Benchmark Estimation Model   
Dependent variable: Inflows  I II 
GDP of source 2.29 
(0.21)*** 
2.31 
(0.20)*** 
GDP of host 1.19 
(0.22)*** 
1.79 
(0.26)*** 
GDP per capita of source 3.07 
(0.82)*** 
3.20 
(0.81)*** 
GDP per capita host 0.48 
(0.28)* 
0.29 
(0.28) 
Time dummy variables Yes Yes 
Continent dummies No Yes 
N (uncensored, censored) 3780  
(2925, 855) 
3780  
(2925, 855) 
Log-likelihood -11404.23 -11394.48 
Likelihood-ratio test : χ2 (probability) 288.13 (0.00) 261.23 (0.00) 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.   
 
In Table 2, the basic model is augmented by the log of trade flows between country pairs. In 
order to avoid an endogeneity bias, this variable is lagged one-period. An increasing amount of 
bilateral trade is intra-industry, and most of the intra-industry trade is carried out by 
multinationals. This suggests FDI and trade can be complements. Alternatively, trade and FDI 
can be substitutes, which would imply a negative relationship between the two variables. This 
can be the case if there are high trade costs between two countries, and FDI is carried out to 
replace exports (an extended version of the so-called ‘tariff-jumping’ argument). Our findings 
indicate that the nature of the relationship is complementary. FDI inflows into emerging markets 
are positively correlated with trade flows: country-pairs that trade more also exchange larger 
FDI flows. An interpretation of this is that trade flows facilitate investment abroad resulting in 
                                                     
7 STATA recommends that the results from the model estimated by 12 quadratures (default) points be 
compared to results from 16 quadrature points. If the relative difference in the estimated coefficients is 
larger than 1%, then the coefficients are not stable. If this is the case, it may be that the random-effects 
estimator is the wrong model.  
8 The time dummies are jointly significant. The test results are not reported.    
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reduced transaction costs as business relations are already in place. Not surprisingly, gravity-
type variables such as the size of the host countries are not robust to the inclusion of lagged 
trade, while the economic significance of the source country size is reduced but statistically 
significant. Per capita GDP in the source country has the only significant coefficient at the 1% 
level, with or without continent dummies, but compared to Table 1 its economic significance is 
also reduced. 
Table 2. The effect of bilateral trade on FDI inflows 
Dependent variable: Inflows  I II 
GDP of source 0.47 
(0.27)* 
0.46 
(0.27)* 
GDP of host -0.04 
(0.23) 
0.35 
(0.27) 
GDP per capita of source 2.81 
(0.74)*** 
2.92 
(0.73)*** 
GDP per capita host 0.56 
(0.26)** 
0.21 
(0.28) 
Trade (-1) 2.12 
(0.23)*** 
2.14 
(0.24)*** 
Time dummy variables Yes Yes 
Continent dummies No Yes 
N (uncensored, censored) 3565 
(2765, 800) 
3565  
(2765, 800) 
Log-likelihood -10721.219 -10714.463 
Likelihood-ratio test : χ2 (probability) 145.39 (0.00) 127.98 (0.00) 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.   
 
In Table 3, we augment the benchmark equation by an index of human-capital endowment in 
the host economies (education as proxied by average years of schooling in the total population 
of 25 and over). This is in line with theoretical and empirical research pointing to the role of 
human capital in enhancing productivity, and in raising the rate of return on physical capital 
given per capita income. Since our variable is only available for intervals of five years (see 
Barro & Lee, 2000), the sample size is considerably smaller and the dependent variable is 
averaged over sub-periods.9  Our previous results are robust to the inclusion of human capital 
endowments in the host countries. The GDP of both the source and host countries and the per 
capita GDP in the source country are significant. Average education in the emerging economies 
is positively and significantly correlated with FDI inflows, but this result is not robust to the 
inclusion of continent dummies (as if there were a regional bias in education standards). 
Interestingly, the coefficient of per capita GDP in the host country now shows a negative 
coefficient (though not significant) as predicted by the neoclassical model with human capital. 
 
                                                     
9 The sub-periods are 1992-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004. The data points for years of schooling are 
1990, 1995 and 2000.   
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Table 3. The effect of human capital on FDI inflows 
Dependent variable: Average Inflows  I II 
GDP of source 2.35 
(0.21)*** 
2.35 
(0.21)*** 
GDP of host 0.96 
(0.26)*** 
1.47 
(0.29)*** 
GDP per capita of source 3.25 
(0.86)*** 
3.31 
(0.85)*** 
GDP per capita host -0.41 
(0.32) 
-0.33 
(0.34) 
Education 0.37 
(0.15)*** 
0.02 
(0.16) 
Time dummy variables Yes Yes 
Continent dummies No Yes 
N (uncensored, censored) 928  
(801, 127) 
928  
(801, 127) 
Log-likelihood -2841.81 -2835.37 
Likelihood-ratio test : χ2 (probability) 15.49 (0.00) 13.41 (0.00) 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.   
Table 4 introduces privatisation proceeds as a control variable measuring market-oriented 
reform in emerging economies. Privatisation proceeds are positively and significantly correlated 
with the FDI inflows as expected, and controlling for privatisation all GDP and per capita 
income variables are statistically significant. However, per capita GDP in the host country has a 
positive sign, contrary to what was predicted by the growth-type approach: this suggests that 
once economic reform is taken into account, richer and not poorer emerging economies attract 
more FDI. Privatisation proceeds are an output measure of economic reform, which has the 
drawback of possibly leading to endogeneity problems.10 In order to cope with that, we include 
the lagged value of the proceeds in column 2, which however turns out to be not significant. In 
column 3, to check the robustness of the results, we control for lagged trade as well as for 
contemporaneous privatisation proceeds. Privatisation is positively and significantly correlated 
with FDI, however, the size of the host and source countries are not robust when trade is 
controlled for, similar to the results in Table 2. 
In Table 5, we introduce the democracy binary variable. We follow Giavazzi and Tabellini 
(2004) who use a similar democracy dummy variable based on the index variable Polity2 from 
the POLITY IV Project. Polity2 is a composite index (ranging from -10 to 10) that measures the 
quality of the democracy in a country.11 Our dummy variable takes the value of 1 when the host 
country makes a permanent (i.e. with no reversals of policy during the observed period) 
transition to democracy. For the date of transition to democracy, we, like Giavazzi and Tabellini 
(2004), take the point when Polity2 index takes values greater than zero.    
                                                     
10 Carstensen and Toubal (2003) suggest an input measure of privatization method in Central Eastern 
European countries, but based on subjective evaluations. 
11 The Polity2 index is a composite index of the following underlying variables: competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraint on the chief executive, regulation of 
participation and competitiveness of political participation.  
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Table 4. The effect of privatisation proceeds on FDI inflows 
Dependent variable: Inflows  I II III 
GDP of source 2.18 
(0.21)*** 
2.28 
(0.21)*** 
0.37 
(0.27) 
GDP of host 0.94 
(0.24)*** 
1.56 
(0.28)*** 
-0.29 
(0.28) 
GDP per capita of source 2.31 
(0.84)*** 
2.34 
(0.84)*** 
2.08 
(0.74)*** 
GDP per capita host 0.59 
(0.31)* 
1.28 
(0.40)*** 
0.20 
(0.36) 
Privatisation proceeds 0.34 
(0.11)*** 
 0.35 
(0.11)*** 
Privatisation proceeds (-1)  0.14 
(0.11) 
 
Trade (-1)   2.22 
(0.24)*** 
Time dummy variables Yes Yes Yes 
Continent dummies No Yes Yes 
N (uncensored, censored) 2665 
(2130,535) 
2710  
(2149, 561) 
2599 
(2079, 520) 
Log-likelihood -8086.99 -8223.82 -7845.89 
Likelihood-ratio test : χ2 (probability) 1841.20 (0.00) 163.35 (0.00) 83.51 (0.00) 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.   
A priori, we would expect to see a positive surge in FDI inflows to emerging markets for a few 
years after transition and a levelling off in the years to follow as new investment projects are 
exploited. In order to capture the diminishing effect of transition to democracy, we created 
dummy variables (democracy_1, democracy_2, democracy_3, democracy_4) that take the value 
1, if the transition was made more than one year ago (two years ago, three years ago and four 
years ago respectively), and zero for the years before.  
One would expect that democracy leads to larger FDI flows once gravity and growth-type 
variables are controlled for, but columns 1 and 2 show that the democracy variable is not 
significant when included in the baseline equation. These results suggest that although transition 
to democracy does seem to have a positive impact on FDI, on the year of transition and two 
years into it, these results are not statistically significant. It may be that risk-averse foreign 
investors watch for the new institutions to take root.12 However, we see that the impact of 
transition translates into a significant surge in FDI after two years (column 3, Table 5) and has a 
diminished but positive effect in the years to follow. The transition to democracy has two effects 
on FDI inflows to emerging markets: (i) it induces a surge in FDI inflows to those emerging 
markets who were already recipients of FDI, and (ii) it is associated with an increased 
probability of receiving FDI inflows for those countries that were prior non-recipients.  
                                                     
12 Most emerging host countries in our sample have undergone economic liberalisation before democratic 
liberalisation. Hence the statistical insignificance of the democracy dummy is not attributable to a lack of 
economic liberalisation.   
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Table 5. The effect of democracy on FDI inflows 
Dependent variable: Inflows  I II III IV V 
GDP of source 2.27 
(0.20)*** 
2.27 
(0.20)*** 
2.28 
(0.20)*** 
2.28 
(0.20)*** 
2.27 
(0.20)*** 
GDP of host 1.84 
(0.26)*** 
1.84 
(0.26)*** 
1.89 
(0.26)*** 
1.85 
(0.26)*** 
1.80 
(0.26)*** 
GDP per capita of source 1.84 
(0.26)*** 
3.11 
(0.82)*** 
3.12 
(0.82)*** 
3.12 
(0.82)*** 
3.10 
(0.82)*** 
GDP per capita host 0.45 
(0.33) 
0.41 
(0.33) 
0.20 
(0.33) 
0.23 
(0.33)*** 
0.44 
(0.33) 
Democracy 0.84 (0.68)     
Democracy_1  0.92 (0.59)    
Democracy_2   1.98 (0.56)***   
Democracy_3    1.72 (0.52)***  
Democracy_4     0.69 (0.49) 
Time dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Continent dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (uncensored, censored) 3637(2819,818) 3637(2819,818) 3637(2819,818) 3637(2819,818) 3637(2819,818) 
Log-likelihood -10970.162 -10969.71 -10964.63 -10965.43 -10969.94 
Likelihood-ratio test : χ2 (probability) 248.63 (0.00) 247.92 (0.00) 248.81 (0.00) 249.64 (0.00) 248.95 (0.00) 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.   
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In Table 6, we jointly model the institutional and economic reform side of FDI flows from 
North to South countries. In column 1, democracy and privatisation proceeds turns out to be 
both positively and significantly associated to larger FDI flows in emerging economies, while 
the results concerning GDPs and per capita incomes are in line with those in the previous tables. 
As shown in column 2, the positive joint role of democracy and market-oriented reform is not 
confirmed when we include lagged privatisation proceeds as a proxy for reform. In the last 
column, we introduce the lagged trade variable to check the robustness of results from column 
1. Both democratic liberalisation and economic reform are robust and positively correlated with 
FDI inflows when trade is controlled for. 
Table 6. The effect of democracy and economic reform on FDI inflows 
Dependent variable: Inflows  I II III 
GDP of source 2.19 
(0.21)*** 
2.28 
(0.21)*** 
0.34 
(0.27) 
GDP of host 1.24 
(0.28)*** 
1.59 
(0.28)*** 
-0.20 
(0.28) 
GDP per capita of source 2.31 
(0.83)*** 
2.33 
(0.84)*** 
2.04 
(0.73)*** 
GDP per capita host 0.29 
(0.40) 
1.18 
(0.42)*** 
-0.16 
(0.37) 
Democracy 1.53 
(0.67)** 
0.55 
(0.72) 
1.81 
(0.61)*** 
Privatisation proceeds 0.35 
(0.11)*** 
 0.38 
(0.11)*** 
Privatisation proceeds (-1)  0.14 
(0.11) 
 
Trade (-1)   2.26 
(0.24)*** 
Time dummy variables Yes Yes Yes 
Continent dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N  
(uncensored, censored) 
2665 
(2130, 535) 
2710 
(2149, 561) 
2599 
(2079, 520) 
Log-likelihood -8083.43 -8223.53 -7841.58 
Likelihood-ratio test : χ2 (probability) 172.11 (0.00) 161.21 (0.00) 77.22 (0.00) 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.   
A general robustness test of these results is in Table 7, where we introduce a EU binary variable 
to evaluate the impact of the start of EU membership negotiations. The European Commission 
and Council allow the start of official accession negotiations with an applicant emerging 
country only after this country has complied with three sets of so-called Copenhagen criteria, 
which require a number of reforms leading to democracy and civil rights, the establishment of a 
sound market economy, and macroeconomic stabilisation. Hence, the EU dummy can be viewed 
as a comprehensive indicator of political and economic reform, which however has the 
disadvantage of being useful only for European countries.  
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Table 7. The effect of EU membership negotiations 
Dependent variable: Inflows  I II III IV V 
GDP of source 2.31 
(0.20)*** 
2.27 
(0.20)*** 
2.19 
(0.21)*** 
2.20 
(0.21)*** 
0.36 
(0.27) 
GDP of host 1.85 
(0.26)*** 
1.90 
(0.26)*** 
1.19 
(0.28)*** 
1.29 
(0.28)*** 
-0.14 
(0.28) 
GDP per capita of source 3.21 
(0.79)*** 
3.11 
(0.81)*** 
2.33 
(0.83)*** 
2.31 
(0.82)*** 
2.02 
(0.72)*** 
GDP per capita host 0.04 
(0.29) 
0.16 
(0.34) 
0.37 
(0.40) 
0.13 
(0.41) 
-0.29 
(0.38) 
EU dummy 1.95 (0.59)*** 1.85 (0.60)*** 1.11 (0.66)* 1.09 (0.66)* 0.87 (0.66) 
Democracy  0.76 (0.66)  1.51 (0.66)** 1.79 (0.61)*** 
Privatisation proceeds    0.30 
(0.11)*** 
0.33 
(0.11)*** 
0.36 
(0.11)*** 
Trade (-1)     2.24 
(0.24)*** 
Time dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Continent dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  
(uncensored, censored) 
3780 
(2925, 855) 
3637 
(2819, 818) 
2665  
(2130, 535) 
2665  
(2130, 535) 
2599 
(2079, 520) 
Log-likelihood -11389.08 -10965.5 -8084.66 -8082.07 -7840.72 
Likelihood-ratio test : χ2 (probability) 237.68 (0.00) 228.33 (0.00) 166.24 (0.00) 163.62 (0.00) 70.78 (0.00) 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.   
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As shown in column 1, the EU variable alone is significant and has a strong positive impact on 
FDI inflows: once emerging countries have started membership negotiations with the EU, they 
have been receiving larger amounts of FDI from the source countries. This is true even when 
continent dummies are included, although once regional dummies are plugged in the regression 
the EU dummy is likely to capture part of the effect of the EU membership. The EU dummy is 
robust to the inclusion of the democracy and privatisation proceeds separately in columns 2 and 
3. In column 4, when both democracy and privatisation are taken into account, their coefficients 
are significant while that of the EU dummy is statistically significant at 10%: we interpret this 
as evidence that the role of democracy and market-oriented reform is rather robust and 
widespread beyond European borders. Also, the start of membership negotiations for joining the 
EU has a significant positive impact on FDI inflows in candidate countries even when 
democratic and economic reform is controlled for directly. This residual effect of the EU 
dummy beyond institutional and market reform is not robust when bilateral trade is controlled 
for in column 5 in Table 7. This suggests that the EU dummy may have been a proxy for the 
level of economic integration between candidate countries and the EU.  
Overall, we find that our hybrid model of FDI inflows from rich countries to the emerging 
markets works rather well, although the Lucas puzzle of why poor countries do not get most of 
the net capital flows is left partly unexplained even when educational attainments are taken into 
account. When controlled for bilateral trade, much of the economic significance in our hybrid 
model is reduced (also wiped out), most probably because gravity-type variables, such as GDPs 
and distance affect trade as well as FDI. Democracy and privatisation proceeds, taken as a 
measure of economic reform, turn out to be both positively and significantly associated to larger 
FDI flows in emerging economies. Our results also indicate that democracy alone is significant 
and has an impact only two years after democratisation has taken place, while it is immediately 
significant when associated with privatisation proceeds. This suggests that democratisation and 
economic reform mutually reinforce one another. This finding is robust to the inclusion of an 
EU dummy that captures the start of EU accession negotiations that is in turn related to a broad 
menu of political and economic reforms.  
5. Final remarks 
The literature on the economic effects of institutions and reform is growing rapidly. Hence, 
there is also new interest in explaining FDI flows by institutional factors. Nevertheless, the 
impact of democracy on FDI has been examined by only a few authors. Trying to explain FDI 
by institutional factors is challenging in many ways. First, there is a need for objective rather 
than subjective measures of institutional quality and reform. Second, there is a serious problem 
of potential endogeneity as institutional factors are usually highly correlated with economic 
performance.  
We studied the role of democracy and market-oriented reform in fostering FDI inflows from 
advanced to emerging countries in the context of a hybrid model combining gravity with growth 
determinants of international capital flows. We employed a binary variable for democracy, and 
privatisation proceeds (in US dollars) for economic reform, trying to overcome the 
‘subjectiveness bias’. At the same time, we are aware that more research is needed to cope with 
endogeneity and to move onto more comprehensive measures of institutions and reform. 
There are three important conclusions we can draw from our results. First, we find that the size 
of both the source and the host countries, and per capita income of the source country are 
important determinants of FDI flows, whereas there is no evidence that per capita income in the 
host country matters. This points out that the Lucas puzzle is still to be explained, and has 
interesting implications in the case of FDI: rich source countries invest in large emerging 
markets, but there is no indication that this is to exploit cheap labour. Second, democracy alone 
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is significant and has an impact only two years after democratisation has taken place. Our key 
result is that democracy and privatisation turn out to be jointly associated with not only larger 
FDI inflows to emerging economies, but also with an increased probability of receiving positive 
flows. This suggests that democratisation and economic reform mutually reinforce one another. 
Third, these findings are robust even when the start of EU accession negotiations (which is 
related to a broad menu of political and economic reform) is taken into account. This indicates 
that the role of democracy and market-oriented reform are robust determinants of North-South 
FDI flows. In addition, our results can be interpreted as evidence that the prospect of joining the 
EU can act as an anchor for the host country. Above and beyond other emerging host countries, 
the ones that started EU membership negotiations are likely looked upon by direct investors as 
irreversibly anchored in democracy and market-oriented reforms.  
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Appendix A 
In order to avoid the loss of valuable information, the dependent variable is transformed. For 
large values of inflwit , ln (inflwit +1) ≈ ln(inflwit ). For small values ln (inflwit +1) ≈ inflwit , this 
transformation is more like a semi-log tobit relationship. Different versions of this 
transformation were used by Eichengreen and Irwin (1996), Eaton and Tamura (1994) and Wei 
(2000). This transformation takes care of zero observations, leaving out negative observations of 
direct investment. Yeyati et al. (2003) offer a solution to this problem by the following 
transformation:      
inflwit  = ln (|inflwit |+1). sign (inflwit) 
By this transformation, negative values are retained, and the coefficients from an OLS 
regression can still be interpreted as elasticities for large values of the dependent variable. For 
this transformation, we measure FDI inflows in dollars (not millions) and hence adding 1 is 
equivalent to adding one dollar to gross inflows.     
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Appendix B 
Our dataset includes 14 North source countries and 24 South host countries over 1992-2004 
(336 cross-sections by 13 years). 
 
List of countries in sample: 
Source countries 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US 
Host Countries (year of permanent democratisation) 
Argentina (1983), Bulgaria (1990), Brazil (1985), Chile (1989), China (-), Colombia (1957), 
Czech Republic (1990), Egypt (-), Hungary (1989), Indonesia (1999), India (1950), South Korea 
(1987), Mexico (1994), Malaysia (1957), Morocco (-), Philippines (1986), Poland (1989), 
Russia (1992), Romania (1990), South Africa (, Slovakia (1993), Slovenia (1991), Thailand 
(1992) and Turkey (1983). 
 
 
20 | 
Appendix C 
Data definition and sources 
Gross FDI inflows: Foreign Direct Investment inflows from source country to host country in 
constant 2000 US dollars (OECD International Investment Statistics Yearbook, 2006).  
GDP: Gross domestic product in constant 2000 US dollars USD (World Economic Outlook 
Database, IMF). 
GDP per capita: Gross domestic per capita in constant 2000 US dollars (World Economic 
Outlook, IMF). 
Bilateral trade: Bilateral exports from source country to host country in constant 2000 US 
dollars USD (Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF). 
Education: Average years of schooling of the total population age 25 and over, (Barro-Lee, 
2000). 
Privatisation proceeds: Privatisation proceeds in constant 2000 US dollars (World Bank). 
Democracy dummy: dummy variable takes the value ‘1’ when political regime changes into 
permanent democracy, zero otherwise.  
EU dummy: dummy equals ‘1’ for the year that the emerging country starts EU membership 
negotiations and onwards (zero for the period before). 
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